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Cross-country differences in graduate overeducation and its persistence**
We investigate the factors that contribute to the cross-country variation in graduate 
overeducation and its persistence by means of multi-level analysis. Our analysis is based 
on data from representative surveys among graduates in thirteen European countries and 
Japan and focuses on the jobs six months and five years after graduation. Major factors 
to explain the cross-country variation in overeducation and its persistence are found to 
be differences in the structural imbalance between the overall demand and supply of 
skilled workers, differences in the imbalance between the demanded and supplied fields 
of study and differences in the business cycle at the time of graduation. Also the quality 
and orientation (general versus vocational) of the educational program are important, but 
particularly to explain within-country differences. Finally, labour market institutions such 
as the strictness of the employment protection legislation are found to be less important. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In most developed countries, investments in education have gradually increased over the past decades. 
This evolution has resulted in growing concerns among researchers and policy-makers about so-called 
overeducation in the labour market. A large number of studies indeed found that a substantial part of the 
working population in most developed countries works in jobs with requirements below their level of 
education (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000; McGuinness, 2006). Moreover, it is usually found 
that the return to education is lower for these workers than for those working in jobs with requirements 
that match their education (Hartog, 2000). Similarly, several studies noted that overeducation can have 
strong negative effects on the mental well-being of the workers (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Ver-
haest and Omey, 2009). Yet, despite this vast literature, several questions remain to be answered. 
 
A first question is related to the differences in the level of overeducation across countries. Studies for the 
US labour market usually note somewhat higher incidences of overeducation than studies for European 
countries such as The Netherlands (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000; McGuinness, 2006). Yet, 
results are difficult to compare because of the different techniques applied for the measurement of over-
education and the different samples and time periods under focus. Consequently, few attempts have been 
made to detect the driving factors behind overeducation at the country level1. A scarce exception is a 
study by Di Pietro (2002), who focussed on differences within the European Union on the basis of com-
parative labour force data for 1995. He noted relatively high levels of overeducation among the highly 
educated in the Southern European countries and the UK compared to other member countries like 
Germany, France or The Netherlands. Further analyses revealed a positive impact on these levels of the 
change in the percentage of educational attainment of the population and the strictness of employment 
protection legislation, and a negative effect of the change in R&D investments. Overeducation was 
otherwise found to be unrelated to the unemployment rate. This conclusion with respect to the unem-
ployment rate was also made by Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) on the basis of a meta-analysis 
of the literature. They found a positive relation between overeducation and the labour force growth rate. 
So, the results of both studies suggest that cross-country differences in overeducation rather result from 
structural differences in demand and supply than from cyclical fluctuations. However, several issues stay 
unclear. That the incidence of overeducation is related to the growth in the supply of educated workers, 
for example, does not necessarily imply that countries with a more highly educated work force also face 
substantially more overeducation problems. After all, supply might create its own demand with some 
lags. Moreover, although the business cycle seems not to be a decisive factor in the explanation of the 
overall level of overeducation, it might still account for cross-country differences in overeducation among 
particular groups such as new labour market entrants. Additionally, given the strong differences in 
structural unemployment across various countries, the unemployment rate might not be a suitable indica-
tor to account for cyclical differences across countries. Finally, also other factors such as the institutions 
with respect to the educational system might play a role. 
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A second question is related to the persistence of overeducation for individual workers. According to the 
career mobility theory by Sicherman and Galor (1990), overeducation is not problematic as it is the result 
of a career mobility plan. Yet, the extent to which overeducation is a temporary problem for individuals 
seems to differ across countries. Several studies for the US (Sicherman, 1991; Robst, 1995a; Rubb, 2003) 
and for the Netherlands (Dekker et al., 2002; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2003; Groeneveld and 
Hartog, 2004) concluded that overeducation is rather a temporary problem for most workers. Rubb, for 
example, estimated a yearly exit rate out of overeducation of about 20%. However, for British, German, 
or Belgian workers, overeducation seems to be much more permanent (Battu et al., 1999; Büchel and 
Mertens, 2004; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Sloane et al., 1999; Verhaest and Schatteman, 2010). The 
example of Germany suggests that a relatively low overall level of overeducation not necessarily implies 
that overeducation is rather a temporary problem for those affected by it. So, also with respect to the per-
sistence of overeducation, additional research is needed to understand what drives the differences across 
countries. The only study that focussed more profoundly on these country differences is a study by Sche-
rer (2004), who made a comparison of the British, German and Italian labour market. Although her results 
indicated that overeducation is rather a persistent problem in all three countries, she also found that the 
negative consequences of overeducation for the future career are less pronounced in the UK compared to 
Italy and Germany. Along with the results for the US on the persistence of overeducation in other studies, 
this suggests that labour market flexibility can also reduce the degree to which overeducation is a 
persistent problem for individuals. However, whether this observed relation should be attributed to other 
underlying factors such as cyclical fluctuations, the educational institutions, or the overall supply of edu-
cated workers remains to be investigated. 
 
The central aim of this paper is to investigate some of the factors underlying cross-country differences in 
overeducation and its persistence in more detail. To do so, we make use of the REFLEX-data on the tran-
sition from tertiary education to work in fifteen European countries and Japan. These data enable to 
measure overeducation in a consistent way across countries for graduates that entered the labour market 
in the year 2000. Moreover, a comparison between the first employment after leaving school and the 
employment five years later enables to investigate the extent to which overeducation is a persistent 
problem. By means of multi-level techniques, we investigate which factors contribute to the cross-country 
variation in the incidence of overeducation in the first job, the job five years later and the overall exit 
rates out of overeducation and good matches between these two moments in time. 
 
We conclude that a substantial part of the cross-country variation in overeducation can be attributed to 
differences in the imbalance between the demanded and supplied fields of study on the labour market. 
This holds primarily for the overeducation during the transition phase (i.e. in the first job). The two other 
factors that are important in explaining cross-country differences in overeducation are the business cycle 
and the relative supply of educated workers. Graduates that enter the labour market during a recession 
and/or face fierce competition from other highly educated individuals are much more likely to be 
overeducated in their first job. Interestingly, we find no relation between overeducation and its 
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persistence and the absolute share of highly educated individuals in a country. This seems to confirm the 
hypothesis that supply might create its own demand. Finally, conversely to the previous study by Di 
Pietro (2002), we found no evidence of a positive relation between the incidence of overeducation and the 
strictness of the employment protection legislation. 
 
Also the quality and orientation of the study program are important, primarily for the explanation of 
within-country differences in overeducation. This seems to support the heterogeneous skills hypothesis 
which states that those who are formally overeducated just lack the necessarily skills (see, e.g., Allen and 
van der Velden, 2001). The results with respect to the orientation of the study program are more nuanced. 
Those with a generally oriented program have a lower likelihood to have a good match in the first job and 
to stay in a good match. Their ability to use overeducation as a stepping stone, however, was found to be 
higher. These findings are consistent with the view that vocational systems are successful in the acqui-
sition of specific skills, whereas general systems particularly result in the acquisition of generic skills.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we elaborate the theoretical framework and 
formulate the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4 we elaborate the estimation 
methodology. Section 5 contains the results followed by Section 6 with the conclusions.  
 
II. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
The Demand and Supply context 
 
Business cycle dynamics deliver a potential explanation for cross-country differences in graduate over-
education. Several theories predict that overeducation, measured at the same point in time, will be higher 
in countries that face a recession. Wage rigidity models put forward that labour market adjustments to 
temporary shocks occur by a change in the assignment of workers to occupations rather than by wage 
changes (see, e.g., Reder, 1955; Hall, 1974; Thurow, 1975; Okun 1981). For new matches, employers 
change selection and hiring criteria; in existing matches, workers are assigned to other tasks or fired. 
Besides, job search models predict that longer expected search durations urge job seekers to temporarily 
accept a simple job and to pursue their search on-the-job (Gautier, 2002; Dolado et al., 2009). As already 
stated, little empirical evidence thus far confirmed that cyclical fluctuations are indeed important to 
explain overeducation at the macro level. Moreover, also micro-economic studies often find no or only 
partial evidence for the hypothesis that regional differences in the unemployment rate influence the pro-
bability to be overeducated (see, e.g., Büchel and van Ham, 2003; Verhaest and Omey, 2010; Verhaest 
and Schatteman, 2010). Yet, the unemployment rate only measures the business cycle in an indirect way. 
Overeducation might even moderate the relation between unemployment and the business cycle if job 
seekers indeed prefer employment in simple jobs over staying unemployed. Besides, countries and 
regions face large differences in their structural unemployment. Finally, none of the macro-economic stu-
dies focussed on differences in overeducation among young graduates. As the acquisition of firm- and 
 5
occupation-specific human capital makes it less efficient to fire or reassign more experienced workers, we 
might expect that the relation between the business cycle and overeducation is more pronounced for new 
labour market entrants or new hires such as school leavers. That this is not unlikely is demonstrated by 
two empirical findings in the literature. Firstly, Devereux (2000) found that demand shocks particularly 
induce a change in the tasks of low-tenure workers within firms. In a later paper (Devereux, 2002), he 
also showed that the quality of new hires in terms of educational qualifications rises during recessions. 
Secondly, also youth unemployment is generally found to be much more sensitive to the business cycle 
than adult unemployment (OECD, 2008a). So, we test the following hypotheses: 
(H1) Part of the between-country variation in overeducation can be attributed to cyclical factors 
(H2) Cyclical fluctuations are more important for the explanation of overeducation at the start of the 
career than later on. 
 
Countries might also differ in the extent to which there is a more structural imbalance between the 
demand and supply of educated workers. Although most developed countries have gradually increased 
their investments in education, there are still substantial differences in the overall share of higher educa-
ted individuals (see Barro and Lee, 2001). Since the early seventies, it has regularly been stated that these 
huge investments in education inevitably result in more overeducation (see, e.g., Berg, 1970; Livingstone, 
1998). Yet, several economists have theoretically shown that the supply of skilled workers might create 
its own demand. Snower (1995), for instance, demonstrated that high investments in education are a pre-
requisite for the creation of high productivity jobs. Acemoglu (1998) then again showed that an over-
supply of highly skilled workers is likely to induce skill-biased technological change. This suggests that 
the countries with a high share of skilled workers are not necessarily those who face a greater imbalance 
between the demand and supply of skilled workers. So, we test whether: 
(H3) Part of the between-country variation in overeducation can be attributed to differences in the 
structural imbalance between the demand and supply of skilled workers 
(H4) The incidence of overeducation is unrelated to the absolute share of skilled workers in the working 
population 
 
Finally, also the composition of this supply in terms of field of study probably plays a role. Some fields 
are more demanded on the labour market than others. Hence, micro-economic studies regularly show that 
the field of study has a substantial impact on the probability to be overeducated (McGuinness, 2003; 
Frenette, 2004). So, we can expect that overeducation is also more prevalent in those countries with a 
more marked imbalance between the fields of study demanded by employers and those supplied by labour 
market entrants. Since workers can compensate their lack of field-specific skills by additional training, we 
expect that this explanation is particularly relevant at the start of the labour market career but less later on. 
(H5) Part of the between-country variation in overeducation can be attributed to differences in the imba-
lance between demanded and supplied fields of study on the labour market. 
(H6) Imbalances between the demanded and supplied fields of study are more important for the expla-
nation of overeducation at the start of the labour market career than later on 
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The Institutional Context 
 
Along with the importance of imbalances in demand and supply, also the role of the institutional context 
will be investigated. Firstly, the overall quality and selectivity of the educational system in a country is 
likely to be important. Consider a country where the government decides to save on the budget for tertiary 
education, for instance through a reduction of the number of professors per student or through the imple-
mentation of more selective admission criteria. If this results in a drop of the average productivity of 
graduates, employers will apply more stringent selection criteria for these types of job seekers (Green et 
al., 2002). So, we expect that the overall quality and selectivity of the educational system has a negative 
impact on the overall incidence of so-called nominal overeducation and its persistence. Several within-
country studies have already established that the quality or prestige of the study program or institutions is 
a factor to explain overeducation at the individual level (see, e.g., Robst, 1995b; McGuinness, 2003; Di 
Pietro and Cutillo, 2006). Moreover, to the extent that employers have more reliable information regar-
ding the average productivity of graduates than about their individual productivity, we might expect that 
this effect is even more pronounced at more aggregate levels. Hence, the following hypotheses will be 
tested regarding the quality and selectivity of the study program: 
(H7) Part of the between-country variation in graduate overeducation can be attributed to differences in 
the quality and selectivity of the educational system 
(H8) The overall quality and selectivity of the study program has a positive impact on the probability of 
a good match in the first job, on the transition from overeducation to a good match as well as on 
the likelihood to stay in a good match 
 
Secondly, also whether the system is rather generally or vocationally oriented might play a role. Vocatio-
nal systems particularly focus on the acquisition of specific skills that are needed for a particular occupa-
tion. General systems, on the other hand, focus more on the acquisition of generic skills which enable to 
learn the necessarily specific skills more quickly on-the-job. So, we can expect that countries with a voca-
tional educational system face a lower incidence of overeducation in the first job, whereas countries with 
a more general system might be better in avoiding overeducation persistence. In a Belgian study among 
secondary education school leavers (Verhaest and Schatteman, 2010), it was indeed found that those who 
attended a general oriented program have a higher probability to experience a career with a first tempo-
rary period of overeducation. Also with respect to the orientation of the study program, aggregate effects 
might be even more pronounced if employers have only imperfect information regarding the content of 
the individual program.  
(H9) Part of the between-country variation in overeducation can be attributed to differences in the 
vocational orientation of the educational system 
(H10) Vocationally oriented programs are particularly successful in enhancing the probability on a good 
match in the first job, but less in enhancing the transition from overeducation to a good match 
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Finally, also labour market institutions might play a role. Employment protection laws, for instance, 
reduce the overall employment opportunities of outsiders such as school leavers. Moreover, employers 
might rely more on internal promotions for their new vacancies. So, we expect that countries with strin-
gent employment legislation face a higher incidence of overeducation at labour market entry. With res-
pect to the degree of overeducation persistence, predictions are less clear. Whereas internal promotions 
enhance the probability to make the transition from overeducation to a good match, they make it more 
difficult to obtain a higher level job with a different employer. Finally, the probability to keep a good 
match is likely to be higher if individuals are protected against dismissal.  
(H11) Part of the between-country variation in overeducation can be attributed to differences in labour 
market protection legislation 
(H12) The degree of labour market protection has a negative impact on the probability on a good match 
in the first job, and a positive impact on the probability to stay in a good match 
 
III. Data and descriptive analyses 
 
The analysis is based on data of the REFLEX survey, which was carried out among graduates in the follo-
wing 16 countries: Austria, Belgium-Flanders, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For each country, a 
representative sample of graduates from tertiary education who got their degree in the academic year 
1999/2000 has been approached at the end of 2005. The data include, amongst others, detailed infor-
mation on the study program, the first employment after graduation and the employment at the time of the 
survey. For detailed information on the project, we refer to Allen and van der Velden (2007). Two 
countries, namely Estonia and Sweden, are excluded from our analysis. As a non-OECD country, not all 
aggregate indicators that are used in this study are available for Estonia. Sweden is excluded since its 
survey design largely deviates from that of the other countries that were involved in the project. For the 
remaining countries, we restrict the sample to those who were never enrolled in any other tertiary 
education program than the one they finished in 1999/2000. Moreover, with respect to the first job, we 
focus on those who were already employed six months after graduation. Finally, to avoid overre-
presentation of certain countries, the sample of the multivariate analyses is restricted to no more than 
2.000 randomly chosen cases per country. A further drop of observations with missing values delivers a 
final sample of 9505 graduates for the job immediately after graduation and 11184 individuals for the em-
ployment at the time of the survey2. The descriptive country results, reported in this section, are based on 
weighted data. 
 
In Table 1, we report the incidence of overeducation by country for both job observations. The average 
incidence of overeducation in the first job is 26%. Yet, we find substantial differences across countries. 
Countries like Italy, the UK and particularly Spain face a substantial overeducation problem among 
young graduates in their first job. At the other spectrum, we find countries like France, Germany, Portu-
gal and Switzerland with overeducation incidences of less than 20%. For every country, we observe a 
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decline in the overeducation problem during the first five years after graduation. On average, the inciden-
ce of overeducation is about 10 pp lower in the current job compared to the first job. It is not surprising to 
note that the largest drop is realized by those countries with a high initial incidence of overeducation. In 
the UK, for example, the incidence of overeducation dropped by a half between the two observation 
points. A notable exception, however, is Japan where the drop amounts to a little 5 pp, despite the relati-
vely high initial incidence of overeducation. Conversely, the drop is in general much less pronounced in 
the countries with a low initial overeducation problem. The most remarkable example is Germany, where 
the decline is hardly more than 1 pp. Hence, some countries with rather moderate initial levels of over-
education such as The Netherlands and the Czech Republic catch up with Germany five years after 
graduation. 
 
Table 1: The incidence of overeducation six months and five years after graduation 
 6 months after graduation 5 years after graduation Change over time 
Spain 0,450 0,267 -0,183 
United Kingdom 0,410 0,204 -0,206 
Italy 0,380 0,193 -0,187 
Japan 0,298 0,251 -0,047 
Belgium 0,273 0,156 -0,117 
The Netherlands 0,271 0,121 -0,150 
Czech Republic 0,245 0,116 -0,129 
Austria 0,238 0,136 -0,102 
Norway 0,229 0,153 -0,076 
Finland 0,213 0,113 -0,100 
France 0,181 0,114 -0,067 
Switzerland 0,167 0,125 -0,042 
Germany 0,151 0,138 -0,013 
Portugal 0,136 0,100 -0,036 
Country average 0,260 0,156 -0,104 
Data source: REFLEX, own calculations. 
 
Aggregate figures discern the individual transitions made by the graduates. Some individuals will find an 
appropriate job after having been overeducated in the first job; others who immediately find an appro-
priate job might fall back into overeducation thereafter; still others will keep the same match status during 
their early career. So, to get a clearer picture of the country differences in overeducation persistence, we 
also report the country incidences of overeducation in the last job conditional on the status in the job 6 
months after graduation. As shown in Table 2, the countries that face the highest persistence are Ger-
many, Switzerland and particularly Japan: about two thirds of the Japanese graduates who were overedu-
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cated in their first job remain overeducated five years later. For Czech, French and Dutch graduates 
conversely, overeducation is much more a temporary problem. Of course, having a good chance to find a 
job with a good match does not exclude that individuals fall back into overeducation later on. So, we also 
report the incidence of overeducation conditional on being in a good match in the first job. In every 
country, this conditional probability is lower than 10%. Nevertheless, also with respect to this indicator, 
some remarkable differences across countries show up. Japan, for example, combines a high overeduca-
tion persistence with a relatively low stability of good match positions. Italy, by contrast, is characterized 
by an overall low stability of match positions: this country combines a below average overeducation 
persistence with a relatively high probability to fall back in overeducation after an initial good match. 
Finland, the Czech Republic and France have the lowest instability of good matches, which are also 
countries with relatively low levels of overeducation persistence. 
 
Table 2: The incidence of overeducation 5 years after graduation conditional on the overeducation status 
6 months after graduation 
Status 6 months after graduation Good match Overeducated 
Spain 0,065 0,487 
United Kingdom 0,051 0,419 
Italy 0,096 0,380 
Japan 0,086 0,664 
Belgium 0,056 0,358 
The Netherlands 0,047 0,302 
Czech Republic 0,029 0,326 
Austria 0,056 0,385 
Norway 0,043 0,487 
Finland 0,026 0,391 
France 0,032 0,329 
Switzerland 0,041 0,580 
Germany 0,051 0,538 
Portugal 0,047 0,410 
Country average 0,052 0,433 
Data source: REFLEX, own calculations. 
 
In general, the observed differences in the level of overeducation are in line with the results of Di Pietro 
(2002), who noted relatively high levels of overeducation in the UK, Spain and Italy, and relatively low 
levels in France, Germany and The Netherlands. Also some of our results on the persistence of over-edu-
aion are in line with previous findings in the literature. The strong persistence in Germany, for example, 
is largely confirmed by previous research. Similarly, several other studies for The Netherlands already 
found that overeducation is rather a temporary problem in this country. Finally, the rather moderate 
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persistence in the UK in comparison to Germany is in line with Scherer’s (2004) conclusions. We do not 
find, however, that overeducation is rather persistent in Italy or Belgium. Of course, the degree of 
persistence might change over time due to cyclical developments or a change in institutional context. 
Moreover, we also focus on a specific sample of graduates, which might differ in the characteristics of 
their study program from the individuals that were involved in other studies. Which of these factors are 
important will be investigated in the remainder of the paper. 
 
IV. Estimation methodology and model specifications 
 
Four dependent variables are analysed in this paper: the probability of a good match in the first job, the 
probability of a good match in the current job, the probability of a transition from overeducation in the 
first job to a good match in the current job, and the probability to stay in a good match. To analyse the 
determinants of these four indicators, we estimate a series of multi-level probit models. Multi-level or 
random coefficient models allow to control both for variables that are measured at the individual level 
and variables that are related to more aggregate levels such as the country. Van der Velden and Wolbers 
(2003), for example, applied such techniques to investigate cross-country differences in the employment 
opportunities of young people. Compared to an analysis on the basis of aggregate data, this approach 
delivers a number of advantages in our case. Firstly, effects resulting from differences across countries in 
the composition of the cohorts – for instance with respect to gender or age – can easily be accounted for. 
Secondly, it allows to compare the aggregate effects of variables such as the quality and orientation of the 
educational program with their individual-level effect. As already stated, these effects should not 
necessarily be the same. Hence, a simultaneous estimation of both types of effects is likely to deliver a 
more comprehensive picture regarding the role of these characteristics of the educational institutions. 
Finally, as will be explained below, differences in the imbalances between the demanded and supplied 
fields of study (cf. Hypotheses 5 and 6) can easily be accounted for through the inclusion of field of study 
random effects. For a more detailed overview on multi-level modelling, we refer to Snijders and Bosker 
(1999). 
 
In this paper, we consider a three-level structure whereby individuals i are nested in fields of study s, 
which in turn are nested in countries c. Several models are estimated, with the following general form: 
 
isc isc sc cy R U V     1 isc 2 sc 3 cβ X β S β C  
 
Whereby y is a latent variable, X is a vector of characteristics of individual i, S is a vector of charac-
teristics of the field of study s, C is a vector of characteristics of country c and R, U and V are random 
error terms. The number of random effects is 14 at the country level and 110 at the study field level3. 
These models are estimated by means of the GLLAMM command that was implemented in Stata by 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008)4. To assess how much of the overall variance in these models can be 
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attributed to unexplained country-level effects, we make use of the extended version of the McKelvey and 
Zavoina (1975) R² measure for discrete choice models (see Snijders and Bosker, 1999).5 
 
Our baseline model, Model 1a, only contains an intercept and additional random effects at the country 
level. In Model 1b, we include the covariates that are measured at the individual level (X). In that way, 
we are able to assess how much of the overall variation of the four dependent variables in our sample can 
be ascribed to country-level differences after control for compositional effects. The included covariates 
are, amongst others, a dummy for gender, the age of the graduate, a dummy for whether the degree of the 
graduate provides access to a PhD, and the grades. This last variable is based on the respondents’ assess-
ment of their grade in the year of graduation relative to other students. In most countries, individuals were 
asked: ‘How do you rate this grade compared to the students that graduated from your study program?’. 
In the Japanese version, however, only a question regarding the absolute grade is posed. To create a 
uniform variable, both the answers on the absolute grade for Japan and the answers on the relative grade 
for the other countries are standardized for each country6. 
 
In Model 2a, we also include random effects at the level of the study fields. The country-level random 
effects in this model thus represent the average performance of fields of study within a country. This 
specification takes into account that the extent to which graduates choose for more or less successful 
study fields can differ across countries. So, the change in the unexplained variance at the country level 
after the inclusion of the random effects for field of study gives an indication of the extent to which 
between-country differences can be attributed to differences in the imbalance between the demanded and 
supplied fields of study on the labour market (cf. Hypothesis 5 and 6). Model 2b further controls for two 
variables that are measured at the study field level (S), namely the average quality and the average orien-
tation (general versus vocational) of the study program within each study field (cf. Hypotheses 7, 8, 9, 
and 10). These two variables are derived from the respondents’ assessments of six aspects of the content 
of their study program, which had to be rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very high extent). A 
principal component analysis was executed on the answers, with the loadings of the first two factors being 
reported in Table 3. The first factor scores high on the extent to which the programme was regarded to be 
demanding, the extent to which employers are familiar with it as well as the extent to which it was acade-
mically prestigious. Hence, this factor is used as a proxy for the overall quality of the study program. The 
second factor clearly represents the extent to which the program is generally oriented. Average scores 
within each field of study give an indication of their quality and orientation. The individual deviations 
from these averages are additionally included as individual-level covariates in all specifications except in 
the baseline model. 
 
In a final series of models (Model 3a to 3e), we also include the variables that are measured at the country 
level (C). In Model 2b, it is assumed that the country-level effects of the characteristics of the study 
program are equal to their study field-level effects. In a first specification, we relax this assumption and 
further decompose the averages at the field of study level into averages at the country level and their 
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deviations from these country level averages. Further, we include the Output Gap – i.e. the relative diffe-
rence between actual and potential GDP – in the year 2000, computed by the OECD (2006), to account 
for the business cycle (cf. Hypotheses 1). For the probability on a good match in the last job, we also 
estimate an alternative specification with the output gap in 2005 as indicator (cf. Hypothesis 2). The 
output gap measures the overall tension in the economy, whereby a positive value indicates excess 
demand. Given the cross-country differences in structural unemployment, it is a more suitable indicator to 
account for cyclical differences than the unemployment rate. Moreover, it is a more direct measure of the 
business cycle compared to the unemployment gap – i.e. the deviation of the unemployment rate from its 
natural rate. As robustness checks, we execute some estimations on the probability on a good match in the 
last job with these two last indicators as alternative predictors7. The indicators for the supply and demand 
of skilled workers (cf. Hypothesis 3 and 4) are respectively the share of highly educated individuals in the 
population aged 25 or older (Barro and Lee, 2000) and the gross domestic expenditure on R&D (OECD, 
2008b), both for the year 20008. The relative oversupply is then measured as the difference between the 
standardized values of these two indicators. Finally, Hypotheses 11 and 12 are tested by the inclusion of a 
composite measure, developed by the OECD (2004), on the overall strictness of the employment protec-
tion legislation. 
 
Table 3: Derivation of the quality and the orientation of the study program: Principal Components rotated 
factor loadings 
To what extent did the following descriptions apply to 
your study programme? 
 
Component 1 
(Quality of the 
programme) 
Component 2 
(General orientation 
of the programme) 
Programme was generally regarded as demanding 0.400 0.094 
Employers are familiar with the content of the programme 0.386 -0.132 
There was freedom in composing your own programme -0.103 0.590 
Programme had a broad focus 0.077 0.518 
Programme was vocationally oriented 0.299 -0.234 
Programme was academically prestigious 0.374 0.262 
Data source: REFLEX, own calculations. 
 
V. Estimation results 
 
Match status six months after graduation 
 
In Table 4, we report the estimation results on the likelihood to have a good match in the job six months 
after graduation. On the basis of the baseline (Model 1a), it is found that the gross variation between 
countries represents 7.6% of the overall variation. After inclusion of the Level 1 covariates (Model 1b), 
however, this variation increases to 8.4%. Hence, it seems that compositional effects underestimate the 
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overall importance of the country level in the explanation of the match status at the start of the labour 
market career. The coefficients of the included covariates are all statistically significant. Women, for 
example, are found to have a higher likelihood to be overeducated. Theoretical explanations for this out-
come are, amongst others, statistical discrimination (Renes and Ridder, 1995) and spatial constraints 
among married women (Frank, 1978). Nevertheless, many other studies in literature did not note a gender 
effect (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000; Sloane, 2003). Further, we find that also older graduates 
have a higher likelihood to be overeducated. Perhaps, the age at which individuals manage to finish their 
degree works as a negative signal to employers. Another explanation is that older graduates continue in 
the job which they combined with their education. Those with a degree not providing access to a PhD 
then again are found to have a higher probability on a good match. Similar results were also noted in 
other studies (ROA, 2007; Verhaest and Omey, 2003). A potential explanation is given by differences in 
the study program duration. Whereas a bachelor’s degree takes at least three years, a master’s degree can 
usually be obtained in one or two extra years. Hence, the average number of years of overeducation is 
likely to be substantially lower among those working below their master’s degree than among those 
working below their bachelor’s degree. Also in line with the literature is the positive impact of better 
study results on the likelihood to find a good match after leaving school (Battu et al., 1999; Büchel and 
Pollmann-Schult, 2004; Verhaest and Omey, 2010). Finally, our outcomes with respect to the relative 
quality and orientation of the individual study program are in line with Hypotheses 8 and 10: those with a 
study program that is of above-average quality or relatively vocationally oriented given their field of 
study are more likely to have a good match in their first job.  
 
The inclusion of the random effects at the study field level, in Model 2a, results in a substantial drop of 
the residual variance at the level of the country, from 8.4% to 4.1%. Also the unexplained variance at the 
individual level drops and so about 12.3% of the overall variation in our sample can be attributed to field 
level effects. These results clearly support our hypothesis that imbalances between the demanded and 
supplied fields of study on the labour market are an important factor to explain between-country differen-
ces in overeducation among graduates (cf. Hypothesis 5). Differences in the demand for certain study 
fields might, amongst others, be explained by differences in the composition of their study programs. In 
Model 2b, we thus further include the average quality and orientation of each field of study as explanatory 
variables, which indeed leads to a sizeable drop of the residual variance at the level of the study fields. As 
expected, graduates from study fields with a high quality and/or vocationally oriented study program have 
a lower likelihood to be overeducated in their first job after leaving school (cf. Hypotheses 8 and 10). 
Also interesting is the finding that the between-field effects of the quality or orientation of the study 
program are substantially higher than their within-field effects. As already stated, this might be explained 
by signalling effects: employers might only have reliable information regarding the average quality or o-
rientation of the study programs within a certain field of study. Their contribution to the cross-country 
variation of overeducation, however, is unclear. The residual variance at the level of the country, slightly 
increases from 4.1 to 5.7% after the inclusion of these study field-level variables. This suggests that, on  
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Table 4: The probability on a good match in the job six months after leaving school: probit multilevel coefficient estimates (N = 9505) 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e 
Intercept 0.645*** 0.844*** 1.021*** 1.022*** 1.016*** 0.941*** 1.019*** 1.061*** 0.710*** 
Level 1 variables: Graduates -
Women - -0.114*** -0.122*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.120*** 
Age - -0.007** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
Degree not providing access to doctorate - 0.206*** 0.109*** 0.090** 0.088** 0.091** 0.094** 0.090** 0.105***
Study results - 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 
Quality study program: deviation from study field average (a1) - 0.250*** 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.256*** 
General orientation: deviation from study field average (b1) - -0.069*** -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.081*** 
Level 2 variable: Fields of study          
Quality study program: field of study average (a2) - - - 0.471*** - 0.461*** 0.474*** 0.470*** - 
General orientation: field of study average (b2) - - - -0.403*** - -0.408*** -0.405*** -0.404*** - 
Quality study program: deviation from country average (a2) - - - - 0.480*** - - - 0.476*** 
General orientation: deviation from country average (b2) - - - - -0.409*** - - - -0.392*** 
Level 3 variables: Countries          
Quality study program: country average (a3) - - - - 0.304 - - - 0.226 
General orientation: country average (b3) - - - - -0.275 - - - -0.432** 
Output gap 2000 - - - - - 0.056 - - 0.133*** 
Relative oversupply highly educated workers - - - - - - -0.240*** - -0.291*** 
Degree of employment protection - - - - - - - -0.018 0.054 
Chi²-tests          
Chi² (a1=a2) - - - 6.6** 6.6* 5.9** 7.2*** 6.5** 6.3** 
Chi² (b1=b2) - - - 12.2*** 11.3*** 12.6*** 13.4*** 12.2*** 10.4*** 
Chi² (a2=a3) - - - - 0.4 - - - 1.8 
Chi² (b2=b3) - - - - 0.2 - - - 0.0 
Variance decomposition          
Unexplained variance level 1: Graduates 0.924 0.847 0.774 0.767 0.777 0.765 0.776 0.768 0.785 
Unexplained variance level 2: Fields of study - - 0.123 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.044 0.043 0.044 
Unexplained variance level 3: Countries 0.076 0.084 0.041 0.057 0.055 0.055 0.025 0.057 0.009 
Explained variance - 0.069 0.062 0.133 0.125 0.138 0.155 0.132 0.163 
Model Diagnostics          
Log likelihood -5316.7 -5126.6 -4987.1 -4956.8 -4956.5 -4956.4 -4952.1 -4956.8 -4947.8 
Condition number 1.4 64.8 68.2 67.3 154.1 86.9 77.2 152.9 179.0 
Data source: REFLEX, own calculations; *: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. 
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average, the countries with rather successful educational institutions have other unmeasured characteris-
tics which are less beneficial for the match of graduates.  
 
Finally, we also include variables that are measured at the country level. In Model 3a, the study-field 
level effects of the characteristics of the programs are further decomposed in a country-level effect and a 
residual effect. Yet, this does not clarify much: although the coefficients of both country-level variables 
are statistically insignificant, also the hypothesis that their country-level effects are not different from 
their study field-effects cannot be rejected. Further, we account for differences in the output gap, the 
relative oversupply of highly educated workers and the strictness of the employment protection legis-
lation. On the basis of the specifications that include just one of these country-level variables (cf. Model 
3b, 3c and 3d), we only note a statistically significant impact of the relative oversupply of highly educated 
workers. The inclusion of this variable is found to explain more than half of the remaining residual 
variance at the country level (cf. Hypothesis 3). Moreover, once we control jointly for all country-level 
variables (cf. Model 3e), also the coefficient of the output gap becomes statistically significant and the 
residual country-level variance further drops to about 1% (cf. Hypothesis 1). Cross-country differences in 
the incidence of overeducation six months after graduation are thus explained by cyclical fluctuations as 
well as by more structural gaps between demand and supply. The strictness of the employment protection 
legislation, however, is not found to be a decisive factor. While the outcomes with respect to the business 
cycle and the employment protection legislation are in line with our hypotheses, they seem to contradict 
those of previous studies in the literature (cf. Section I). Probably, these variables play a different role 
with respect to the persistence of overeducation and the match status at later points in the career.  
 
Transitions between the first and the current job 
 
In Table 5 and 6, we report the results regarding the match status in the job five years after graduation 
conditional on the match status in the first job. On the basis of the baseline model (Model 1a), we note 
that only 3.3% of the overall variation in the probability to stay in a good match can be attributed to 
country-level effects. After inclusion of the individual-level variables (Model 1b), this proportion slightly 
increases to 3.7%. With respect to the probability to make the transition from overeducation to a good 
match, these figures are respectively 5.8 and 6.5%. It thus seems that country-level effects play a more 
important role at the start of the career than later on. For most of the individual-level variables, results are 
in line with those on the match status in the first job. The unfavourable match status of women, for exam-
ple, is largely confirmed. Whereas women have a higher likelihood to be overeducated immediately after 
graduation, they are not more likely to use their overeducation status as a stepping stone. And if they 
manage to find a good match, they are more likely to fall back into overeducation thereafter. Those with a 
degree not providing access to a PhD do not only have a better match to start with, but are also found to 
have a higher probability to stay in a good match or to get a good match, whereas older graduates and 
those with lower grades, are less likely to get out of overeducation. Further, in line with Hypothesis 8, we 
find that those with a study program that is of above-average quality within their field of study are more 
 16
Table 5: The probability to stay in a good match: probit multilevel coefficient estimates (N = 6495) 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e 
Intercept 1.690*** 1.559*** 1.583*** 1.637*** 1.637*** 1.621*** 1.629*** 1.719*** 1.649*** 
Level 1 variables -
Women - -0.268*** -0.271*** -0.272*** -0.271*** -0.272*** -0.269*** -0.271*** -0.265*** 
Age - 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
Degree not providing access to doctorate - 0.172** 0.161** 0.105 0.111 0.107 0.117* 0.099 0.154*
Study results - 0.044 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.038 
Quality study program: deviation from study field average (a1) - 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 
General orientation: deviation from study field average (b1) - -0.031 -0.032 -0.035 -0.034 -0.035 -0.035 -0.036 -0.031 
Level 2 variable: Fields of study          
Quality study program: field of study average (a2) - - - 0.250*** - 0.245*** 0.263*** 0.250*** - 
General orientation: field of study average (b2) - - - -0.223** - -0.224** -0.243*** -0.231** - 
Quality study program: deviation from country average (a2) - - - - 0.257*** - - - 0.267*** 
General orientation: deviation from country average (b2) - - - - -0.183* - - - -0.166* 
Level 3 variables: Countries          
Quality study program: country average (a3) - - - - 0.307* - - - 0.331** 
General orientation: country average (b3) - - - - -0.417** - - - -0.609*** 
Output gap 2000 - - - - - 0.017 - - 0.059 
Relative oversupply highly educated workers - - - - - - -0.108** - -0.158*** 
Degree of employment protection - - - - - - - -0.037 -0.031 
Chi²-tests          
Chi² (a1=a2) - - - 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.4 1.1 1.2 
Chi² (b1=b2) - - - 4.0** 2.1 4.1** 5.1** 4.3** 1.7 
Chi² (a2=a3) - - - - 0.1 - - - 0.1 
Chi² (b2=b3) - - - - 1.1 - - - 5.5** 
Variance decomposition          
Unexplained variance level 1: school leavers 0.967 0.921 0.917 0.914 0.909 0.914 0.915 0.915 0.912 
Unexplained variance level 2: study programs - - 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexplained variance level 3: countries 0.033 0.037 0.034 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.015 0.022 0.005 
Explained variance - 0.041 0.041 0.063 0.069 0.063 0.069 0.063 0.083 
Model Diagnostics          
Log likelihood -1196.8 -1168.2 -1167.9 -1155.2 -1154.6 -1155.1 -1153.3 -1155.1 -1150.0 
Condition number 1.2 118.0 121.0 136.8 141.6 140.9 153.3 180.2 239.8 
Data source: REFLEX, own calculations; *: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. 
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Table 6: The probability to make the transition from overeducation to a good match: probit multilevel coefficient estimates (N = 2239) 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e 
Intercept 0.151** 0.515** 0.423** 0.422** 0.427** 0.272 0.422** 0.240 0.214 
Level 1 variables -
Women - 0.034 0.039 0.067 0.068 0.061 0.067 0.066 0.067 
Age - -0.012** -0.011* -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** 
Degree not providing access to doctorate - 0.094 0.130* 0.160** 0.165** 0.165** 0.160** 0.167** 0.173**
Study results - 0.078** 0.080** 0.080** 0.080** 0.080** 0.080** 0.080** 0.079** 
Quality study program: deviation from study field average (a1) - 0.138*** 0.143*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.148*** 
General orientation: deviation from study field average (b1) - 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
Level 2 variable: Fields of study          
Quality study program: field of study average (a2) - - - 0.318*** - 0.261** 0.317*** 0.320*** - 
General orientation: field of study average (b2) - - - 0.262** - 0.221* 0.262** 0.276** - 
Quality study program: deviation from country average (a2) - - - - 0.317** - - - 0.313** 
General orientation: deviation from country average (b2) - - - - 0.307** - - - 0.299** 
Level 3 variables: Countries          
Quality study program: country average (a3) - - - - 0.419 - - - 0.202 
General orientation: country average (b3) - - - - 0.007 - - - -0.020 
Output gap 2000 - - - - - 0.132** - - 0.155*** 
Relative oversupply highly educated workers - - - - - - 0.004 - -0.077 
Degree of employment protection - - - - - - - 0.083 0.016 
Chi²-tests          
Chi² (a1=a2) - - - 2.1 1.8 0.9 2.1 2.2 1.6 
Chi² (b1=b2) - - - 1.6 2.2 1.0 1.6 1.9 2.0 
Chi² (a2=a3) - - - - 0.1 - - - 0.2 
Chi² (b2=b3) - - - - 0.9 - - - 1.3 
Variance decomposition          
Unexplained variance level 1: school leavers 0.942 0.904 0.857 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.861 0.867 
Unexplained variance level 2: study programs - - 0.066 0.053 0.052 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.052 
Unexplained variance level 3: countries 0.058 0.065 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.023 0.043 0.042 0.019 
Explained variance - 0.031 0.031 0.041 0.045 0.060 0.042 0.043 0.062 
Model Diagnostics          
Log likelihood -1504.4 -1482.8 -1468.9 -1464.5 -1463.9 -1462.1 -1464.5 -1464.2 -1461.1 
Condition number 1.3 91.2 95.9 98.6 134.6 120.5 98.7 156.6 186.7 
Data source: REFLEX, own calculations; *: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. 
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likely to stay in a good match as well as to make the transition from overeducation to a good match. 
Finally, the results with respect to the orientation of the study program are in line with Hypothesis 10: 
whereas those with a relatively generally oriented study program given their field of study are less likely 
to have a good match in their first job, they are more likely to use overeducation as a stepping stone. 
 
Also the study field-level effects are found to be less important for the explanation of the transitions 
between the two time points compared to the match status in the first job (cf. Model 2a). With respect to 
the probability to stay in a good match, they explain even less than 1% of the overall variance. Hence, the 
unexplained country-level variance of this probability hardly changes after the inclusion of these random 
effects at the level of the field of study. Imbalances in the demand and supply of study fields are found to 
be a bit more important for the explanation of country-level variance of the probability to get out of over-
education: the unexplained country-level variance for this probability drops from 6.5 to 4.5%. In Model 
2b, we further add the average quality and orientation of each study field as explanatory variables. The 
results on the average quality and selectivity of the study program confirm Hypothesis 8: school leavers 
from subjects with a study program of above-average quality are more likely to stay in a good match or to 
make the transition from overeducation to a good match. Generally oriented study fields result in a lower 
probability to keep a good match, but also in a higher probability to use overeducation as a stepping stone 
(cf. Hypothesis 10). The inclusion of these variables result in a further decrease of the unexplained 
country-level variance of the probability to stay in a good match from 3.4 to 2.3%. With respect to the 
probability to make the transition from overeducation to a good match, however, this variance hardly 
changes.  
 
Further decomposition of the subject-level effects confirms that the educational institutions primarily 
contribute to cross-country differences in the probability to stay in a good match (cf. Model 3a). The like-
lihood to stay in a good match is higher in countries with a high-quality and vocational education system. 
Moreover, the country-level effect of the vocational orientation of the program is found to be even more 
pronounced than its study field-level effect (cf. Model 3e). Conversely, with respect to the persistence of 
overeducation, none of the country-level effects is statistically significant. Nevertheless, also the null 
hypothesis that these country-level effects are not different from the study field-level effects is rejected. 
Finally, also with respect to the effect of the other country-level variables, outcomes differ between the 
two conditional probabilities. Whereas particularly structural differences in the demand and supply ex-
plain the between-country variation of the probability to stay in a good match, rather cyclical factors 
influence the probability to get out of overeducation. Again, we find no evidence that the strictness of the 
employment protection legislation is important for the explanation of the match status.  
 
Match status five years after graduation 
 
We end with an analysis of the determinants of the match status five years after graduation. Our estimates 
confirm that the importance of country-level effects decrease over the career: after control for the indivi-
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dual-level variables (Model 1b), we find that about 5.3% of the overall unexplained variance of the match 
status five years after graduation can be attributed to the country level. The only individual-level variable 
with a statistically insignificant coefficient is the orientation of the program. The negative impact of this 
orientation on the match status in the first employment is thus compensated by the positive impact on the 
probability that overeducation serves as a stepping stone. 
 
Also the importance of the study field-level effects falls over the career: on the basis of Model 3a, we find 
that 6.2% of the overall variance in the match status five years after graduation is attributed to these 
effects compared to 12.3% for the first job. Hypothesis 6, which states that imbalances between the de-
manded and supplied subjects are particularly important at labour market entry, is thus confirmed. Never-
theless, the study field-level effects are still responsible for a drop of the share of the unexplained 
country-level variance to 3.4%. In Model 3b, we further include study field-level variables. Given the 
results on the match in the first job and the transition probabilities, it is not surprising to find again that 
the between-field effect of the quality of the program is larger than the within-study field effect. More-
over, whereas the within-field effect of the program orientation becomes statistically insignificant five 
years after graduation, this is not the case for the between-field effect. So, it seems that school leavers 
from generally oriented fields of study need more than five years to catch up with those from more voca-
tionally oriented fields of study. However, the program characteristics again are found to contribute little 
to the between-country variance: the share of the unexplained country-level variance only drops from 
3.4% to 3.1%.  
 
With respect to the country-level variables, the most convincing evidence is noted for the relative over-
supply of highly educated workers. Introduction of this variable into the model results in a drop of the un-
explained country-level variance from 3.1% to 1.6% (cf. Model 3c). Further inclusion of the remaining 
country-level variables in Model 3e results in a complete reduction of the residual variance at the country 
level. Like for the first job, we note a positive impact from the output gap, a negative impact from a 
relative oversupply of educated workers and from a generally oriented educational system, and no impact 
from the strictness of the employment protection legislation. Moreover, like with respect to the 
probability to stay in a good match, the country-level effect of the orientation of the program is found to 
be more pronounced than the study field- and individual-level effects. Finally, also the effect of the quali-
ty and selectivity of  the educational system is now found to be statistically significant. 
 
Finally, we also report estimates on the basis of some alternative model specifications. The match in the 
current job might not just be affected by the business cycle at the time of labour market entry, but also by 
the economic conditions in later years. As shown in Table 8, the coefficient of the output gap during the 
year 2005 has an unexpected negative sign if no other country-level variables are controlled for. Once we 
also control for the output gap during the year 2000, however, the coefficient becomes statistically insig-
nificantix. Accordingly, the evidence with respect to Hypothesis 2, which states that the business cycle is 
more important to explain overeducation at the start of the career than later on, is nuanced. Although the 
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Table 7: The probability on a good match in the job five years after leaving school: probit multilevel coefficient estimates (N = 11184) 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e 
Intercept 1.027*** 1.319*** 1.400*** 1.409*** 1.409*** 1.301*** 1.409*** 1.410*** 1.231*** 
Level 1 variables: Graduates -         
Women - -0.112*** -0.108*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.099*** 
Age - -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.012*** 
Degree not providing access to doctorate - 0.199*** 0.155*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.149*** 
Study results - 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 
Quality study program: deviation from study field average (a1) - 0.255*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 
General orientation: deviation from study field average (b1) - 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
Level 2 variable: Fields of study          
Quality study program: field of study average (a2) - - - 0.435*** - 0.414*** 0.444*** 0.435*** - 
General orientation: field of study average (b2) - - - -0.159** - -0.170** -0.171** -0.159** - 
Quality study program: deviation from country average (a2) - - - - 0.444*** - - - 0.447*** 
General orientation: deviation from country average (b2) - - - - -0.147* - - - -0.148* 
Level 3 variables: Countries          
Quality study program: country average (a3) - - - - 0.393* - - - 0.266*** 
General orientation: country average (b3) - - - - -0.225 - - - -0.372*** 
Output gap 2000 - - - -  0.080* - - 0.142*** 
Relative oversupply highly educated workers - - - - - - -0.153*** - -0.213*** 
Degree of employment protection - - - - - - - 0.000 0.005
Chi²-tests          
Chi² (a1=a2) - - - 6.4** 6.2** 4.9** 7.3*** 6.4** 6.6** 
Chi² (b1=b2) - - - 4.2** 3.2* 5.0** 5.2** 4.2** 3.4*
Chi² (a2=a3) - - - - 0.1 - - - 2.4 
Chi² (b2=b3) - - - - 0.1 - - - 3.2* 
Variance decomposition 
Unexplained variance level 1: Graduates 0.959 0.879 0.840 0.843 0.843 0.840 0.847 0.843 0.848 
Unexplained variance level 2: Fields of study - - 0.062 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.022 
Unexplained variance level 3: Countries 0.041 0.053 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.024 0.016 0.031 0.000
Explained variance - 0.068 0.064 0.103 0.103 0.112 0.112 0.103 0.129 
Model Diagnostics          
Log likelihood -4783.4 -4613.9 -4563.1 -4536.6 -4536.5 -4535.2 -4533.2 -4536.6 -4522.6 
Condition number 1.4 69.5 73.4 77.4 139.6 93.2 90.4 146.3 202.5 
Data source: REFLEX, own calculations; *: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. 
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Table 8: The probability on a good match five years after leaving school (alternative model specifications): probit multilevel coefficient estimates (N = 11184) 
 Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d Model 4e Model 4f Model 4g Model 4h Model 4i Model 4j 
Level 3 variables           
Output gap 2000 - - 0.119*** - - - - 0.147*** - 0.081**
Output gap 2005 -0.111*** -0.083** -0.024 - - - - - - - 
Unemployment rate 2000 - - - -0.011 -0.016 - - - - - 
Relative unemployment gap 2000 - - - - - -0.354 -0.471* 0.164 - -
Relative oversupply highly ed. work.. - -0.113** -0.188*** - -0.159*** - -0.164*** -0.208*** - - 
Absolute share of highly ed. individ. - - - - - - - - -1.688 -1.090 
Variance decomposition   
Unexpl. var. level 1: school leavers 0.852 0.851 0.847 0.842 0.847 0.842 0.846 0.848 0.843 0.839 
Unexpl. var. level 2: study programs 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.023 
Unexpl. var. level 3: countries 0.016 0.009 0.000 0.030 0.014 0.028 0.012 0.000 0.027 0.025 
Explained variance 0.107 0.115 0.127 0.104 0.115 0.107 0.118 0.127 0.107 0.113 
Model Diagnostics           
Log likelihood -4533.1 -4530.6 -4524.7 -4536.4 -4532.7 -4536.1 -4531.8 -4524.8 -4535.8 -4534.8 
Condition number 99.8 112.3 150.0 114.6 124.2 236.4 226.5 279.6 885.0 817.7 
Also included but not reported: intercept, age, dummy for women, dummy for degrees not providing access to PhD, study results, quality study program: deviation from average, general orientation study program: deviation 
from average, quality of study program: average, and quality of study program: average; 
Data source: REFLEX, own calculations; *: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. 
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match status of more experienced workers indeed seems to be unaffected by business cycle at the time of 
observation, there is a scarring effect from the business cycle at the time of graduation. As additional 
robustness checks, we also execute estimates on the basis of the unemployment rate and the relative 
unemployment gap in 2000. The relative unemployment gap is found to have a statistically significant 
negative effect once we control for the relative oversupply of skilled workers. However, after further in-
clusion of the output gap as explanatory variable, its coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. 
Similarly, the coefficient of the unemployment rate is never statistically significant10. So, the reason why 
other studies failed to find a relation between the business cycle and the incidence of overeducation seems 
to be twofold: they used the ‘wrong’ business cycle indicator and measured at the ‘wrong’ point in time. 
In a last group of models, we include the absolute share of highly educated individuals instead of the 
relative oversupply variable. Yet, in line with Hypothesis 4, we find no indications that the countries with 
a highly educated population are also those with the highest likelihood to be overeducated. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
In this study, we focussed on cross-country differences in overeducation and its persistence among gra-
duates in their five years on the labour market. For this analysis, we used data from the REFLEX study 
regarding the transition from education to work in fifteen European countries and Japan. These graduates 
finished their education during the academic year 1999/2000 and were questioned five years later, in 
2005. By means of multi-level techniques, we analysed the factors that contribute to the cross-country 
variation in the incidence of overeducation in the job six months after graduation, the job five years after 
graduation and the transition probabilities between these two points in time. 
 
First of all, our results indicated that a substantial part of the cross-country variation in overeducation in 
the first job can be attributed to differences in the imbalance between the demanded and supplied fields of 
study on the labour market. For the employment five years after graduation, however, this factor seems to 
be less important, perhaps because workers resolve their lack of the study field-specific skills by additio-
nal training. Also the quality and orientation of the study program are important, primarily for the expla-
nation of within-country differences in overeducation. We noted a positive impact of the quality of the 
program on the probability to find a good match in the first job, the probability to stay in a good match as 
well as on the probability to use overeducation as a stepping stone to a good match. This seems to support 
the heterogeneous skills hypothesis which states that those who are formally overeducated just lack the 
necessarily skills (see, e.g., Allen and van der Velden, 2001). The results with respect to the orientation of 
the study program are more nuanced. Those with a generally oriented program have a lower likelihood to 
have a good match in the first job and to stay in a good match. Their ability to use overeducation as a 
stepping stone, however, was found to be higher. These findings are consistent with the view that vocatio-
nal systems are successful in the acquisition of specific skills, whereas general systems particularly result 
in the acquisition of generic skills. Moreover, they are also in line with segmentation theories (Doeringer 
and Piore, 1971; Dekker et al., 2002): generally educated individuals enter predominantly in internal 
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labour markets which offer internal promotions; vocationally educated individuals enter either in a highly 
protected occupational labour market or get stuck in the secondary segment. The importance of these in-
stitutions for cross-country differences in overeducation, however, is not completely obvious and requires 
further investigation. Only with respect to the probability to stay in a good match, we noted clear support 
for the hypothesis that these characteristics contribute to the cross-country variation.  
 
The two other factors that were found to be important for the explanation of cross-country differences in 
overeducation are the business cycle and the relative supply of educated workers. Graduates that enter the 
labour market during a recession and/or face fierce competition from other highly educated individuals 
are much more likely to be overeducated in their first job. Moreover, the stance of the business cycle at 
the time graduation also influences the extent to which individuals manage to make the transition from 
overeducation to a good match. Hence, entering the labour market during a recession affects the quality of 
the match up to five years later. With respect to the probability to stay in a good match, particularly struc-
tural factors are important: a structural oversupply of highly educated individuals results in higher match 
insecurity. Remarkable is also the finding that overeducation and its persistence are not related to the ab-
solute share of highly educated individuals in a country. Put differently, the countries with the highest 
investments in education are not necessarily those who face a structural oversupply of educated workers. 
This seems to confirm the hypothesis that supply might create its own demand. Finally, conversely to a 
previous study by Di Pietro (2002), we found no evidence on a positive relation between the incidence of 
overeducation and the strictness of the employment protection legislation.  
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Appendix A: Construction of the sample 
 First job Current job 
All respondents (Sweden and Estonia excluded) 38269 38269 
Random selection of maximally 2000 cases/country 24735 24735 
Never enrolled in other tertiary education program 13746 13746 
Employed 6 months after graduation 11153 - 
Employed at time of the survey - 12524 
Observations with missing values excluded 9505 11184 
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Notes 
 
1 A more extended economic literature, dating back to the work of Freeman (1976), focuses on general 
trends in returns to education. We focus on those studies that conceptualize overeducation as a situation in 
which individuals have an educational level that exceeds the required level for the job (cf. Hartog, 2000; 
Green et al., 2002). 
2 For an overview of the construction of these final samples, see Appendix A. 
3 We distinguish a maximum of eight fields of study within each country: (1) education, (2) humanities 
and arts, (3) social sciences, business and law, (4) science, mathematics and computing, (5) engineering, 
manufacturing and construction, (6) agriculture and veterinary, (7) health and welfare, and (8) services. 
For Japan and Switzerland, no observations on subject (8) are available. Those who followed a general 
program (2 individuals) are excluded.  
4 To evaluate and maximize the likelihood, we make use of adaptive quadrature. As shown by Rabe-
Hesketh et al. (2005), adaptive quadrature performs much better than Gauss-Hermite quadrature.  
5 As Veall and Zimmermann (1996) showed on the basis of simulations, these scores are close 
approximations of OLS-R² scores for the underlying latent dependent variables.  
6 Missing values are imputed by their expected values on the basis of OLS regression. 
7 The unemployment gap is measured in relative terms, i.e. the deviation of the unemployment rate from 
its natural rate divided by the unemployment rate.  
8 Due to missing information, Norwegian R&D expenditures are for the year 2001. 
ix These outcomes can be explained by the negative correlation in our sample (-0.260) between the output 
gap in the year 2000 and the output gap in the year 2005. 
10 We also executed estimates on the basis of the unemployment rate and unemployment gap in 2005. The 
coefficient of the unemployment rate in 2005 was never statistically significant. The results for the 
unemployment gap in 2005 were similar to those for the output gap in 2005: an unexpected statistically 
significant positive impact if no other country-level variables are controlled for and an statistically 
insignificant effect once we also control for the output gap in 2000. These results are available upon 
request.  
